INFORMAL RISK SHARING WITHIN CASTES IN INDIA by ADITI GUPTA








A THESIS SUBMITTED 
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SOCIAL 
SCIENCES (RESEARCH) ECONOMICS 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 





Assistant Professor Zhu Shenghao 
 
Examiners: 
Associate Professor Liu Haoming 




I hereby declare that this thesis is my original work and it has been written by me in 
its entirety. I have duly acknowledged all the sources of information which have been 
used in the thesis. 
 








































I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Zhu 
Shenghao for all the guidance and encouragement, without which this thesis would 
not have been possible. I would also like to thank him for the immense patience and 
intellectual support he has provided me during the preparation of the thesis.  
I am also grateful to all the people who have directly and indirectly contributed to this 
thesis at various stages. I am thankful to Professor Song Changcheng and Professor 
Liu Haoming for the invaluable comments they gave during the Graduate Research 
Seminar, which helped me improve the quality of research. 
I am grateful to my parents for their constant support and undying faith in me and last 














Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgement ........................................................................................................ ii 
Summary ...................................................................................................................... iv 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................ v 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 
2. Caste system and its effects on risk sharing .............................................................. 3 
3. Literature review ....................................................................................................... 5 
4. Data ........................................................................................................................... 9 
5. Preliminary analysis ................................................................................................ 12 
5.1 Risk sharing across castes ........................................................................ 12 
5.2 Channels of risk sharing........................................................................... 16 
6. Empirical framework .............................................................................................. 18 
7. Results and discussion ............................................................................................ 19 
7.1 Regression results .................................................................................... 19 
7.2 Robustness checks ..................................................................................... 21 
8. Policy implications .................................................................................................. 23 
9. Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 26 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 27 















The Caste system in India is one of the oldest and enduring hierarchical systems of 
social stratification. Various studies have acknowledged the existence of caste-based 
risk sharing network and worked on its implications on migration and risk taking 
capabilities of individuals and households. In this study, I investigate the disparities in 
risk sharing faced by the members of different caste groups in rural India. I use the 
second wave of India Human Development Survey (IHDS) data to estimate the effect 
of caste on households’ ratio of relative consumption and relative income, which I use 
as a measure of risk sharing. I find that among people belonging to the same income 
group, those from higher castes are better insured than the lower castes. I also find that 
credits from relatives form an important channel of risk sharing within castes. This 
implies that improved access to formal credit and insurance market, irrespective of their 
caste affiliations, would better insure households in rural India. This would help 
achieve better equality of opportunities and would reduce caste-based discrimination. 
Keywords: risk sharing, consumption-income ratio, consumption smoothing, risk 
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The accessibility of formal credit in the rural and agrarian areas of developing 
countries has been predominantly low. This situation is exacerbated by the fact 
that the agriculture based economies are exposed to higher risks due to their 
dependence on rainfall for irrigation and crop yield. This high risk, coupled with 
factors like informational asymmetry and moral hazard, prove to be deterrents 
to the establishment of formal credit market institutions in these areas. Also, 
people in these areas face consumption risk, which is even more difficult to 
insure against through formal channels. To deal with this absence of formal 
credit availability, rural economies tend to devise informal instruments for risk 
mitigation and are dependent on these measures despite their various 
shortcomings.  
There is a large body of work which attempts to study the diverse informal 
insurance mechanisms and their efficacy in managing risks. According to the 
literature, these mechanisms can usually be classified into three major 
categories- 1. Diversification, with respect to crops or occupation. 
Diversification helps in managing risk but may lead to reduced average income. 
2. Consumption smoothing, i.e. saving during the period of high income and 
consuming the saved income during low income period, so that consumption 
does not fluctuate as much with income. It includes buying and selling of assets 
to ensure even consumption. 3. Risk sharing, which involves mutually insuring 
members of a community or a village based network. 
In managing risks, such informal risk mitigation mechanisms are common in 
Indian villages because of lack or absence of formal insurance market and acute 
shortage of proper irrigation system. Around half of India’s farmland lacks 
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proper irrigation and the farmers are dependent on rainfall for irrigation (RBI 
Bulletin, May 2015). As for the availability of formal credit and insurance, there 
have been several attempts by the government to improve their accessibility in 
villages, like encouraging micro-finance schemes, introduction of ‘Kisan Credit 
Cards’ etc., but informal credit continues to constitute a significant part of total 
borrowing. Moreover, there is very little or no social security or safety net 
system provided by the government so as to insure people against consumption 
risk. According to Swaminathan(2012), access to formal credit is 
disproportionately low for the socially oppressed and marginalised classes and 
castes. Most of the formal credit has been obtained by the rich and high caste 
borrowers. Therefore, informal mechanisms to mitigate risk are still prevalent 
in rural India.  
There have been various studies which try to analyse the effect and effectiveness 
of risk sharing in Indian villages within a caste based community network, 
which seems to operate quite strongly.  
Risk sharing operating through caste might give rise to some differential effects, 
which might end up worsening the caste divide. This study assesses how risk 
sharing and insurance varies across castes in rural India.  
To understand this, there is a need to understand the structure of the caste system 
in India, which has been elaborated in the next section. The following section 
includes the mechanism through which caste system operates and its potential 
effects on risk sharing. Section 3 provides a brief summary of the literature 
focussing on informal mechanisms for risk sharing, especially in developing 
economies. Section 4 describes the data used in the study and in Section 5, I 
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perform a preliminary analysis to investigate the potential effects of caste on 
risk sharing and the channels of risk sharing that might be at work. Section 6 
introduces the model and methodology adopted for estimation, while Section 7 
compiles and analyses the results obtained, followed by the policy implications 
of the study. Section 9 concludes the study. 
2. Caste system and its effects on risk sharing 
The Indian caste system is a complex hierarchical structure, which divides the 
population into endogamous groups. Each caste is further divided into sub-caste 
or ‘jatis’. There are around more than 3000 jatis. 
Assignment of caste is based on the ‘accident of birth’. A child born to parents 
of certain caste would belong to the same caste. The basis of this stratification 
was occupation. Each caste was expected to perform certain tasks. There are 
five broad divisions in the caste system, with ‘Brahmins’ being the highest caste 
comprising of priests followed by ‘Kshatriya’, the warrior caste, ‘Vaishya’, the 
merchant caste, ‘Shudras’, the servant caste and ‘Dalits’, the untouchables. The 
lower castes did not have access to education and were expected to perform 
menial jobs.  
This system of stratification has been sustained by endogamy, i.e. individuals 
are not allowed to marry out of their own caste group. In their study, Bidner and 
Eswaran (2015) propose the origin of caste system to be related to gender roles. 
They explain various aspects of castes including endogamy using the gender-
based theory.  
This 3,000 years old system has resulted in systemic discrimination and 
oppression of the lower castes and tribes. The Indian Constitution regards 
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discrimination based on caste illegal, and to provide the backward castes with 
equal opportunity, it specifies quotas for admission to educational institutions 
and applicants for government jobs. For this purpose, the constitution lists the 
castes which are eligible for the caste based reservation based on the 
disadvantage they face in the society. This gave rise to four major caste 
categories. The castes mentioned in the scheduled lists are called Scheduled 
Castes (SCs) and the listed tribes are called Scheduled Tribes (STs), these form 
the group of most disadvantaged sections. A few other castes which are not in 
as disadvantaged position as scheduled castes, but are still backward and need 
stimulus are called Other Backward Castes (OBCs). All other castes are called 
General/Forward Castes. 
Even though laws against caste based discrimination are in place, Indian society 
remains to be largely divided on the basis of castes, and various studies have 
shown that backward castes still face lower social as well as economic status. 
In the specification of caste as a unit of risk sharing, marrying within the sub-
caste or jati plays a pivotal role. It enables the network to be closely tied and 
removes the barrier of information asymmetry to a certain extent. Also, it 
connects various households from different villages covering a wider area and 
ensuring better risk management.  
Not complying with the caste rules or marrying outside the caste would make 
the risk sharing network inaccessible and this fear of losing the social and 
economic security might be an incentive to comply with the caste rules even for 
the lower caste.  
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Since this network works along caste lines and the lower castes are 
economically disadvantaged, I suspect differential effect of caste on 
consumption insurance. Most of the studies on insurance networks have 
focussed on its implications on migration, out marriage (marriage outside caste), 
or its effectiveness on an aggregate level. In this study, I would like to 
investigate if different castes are affected differently because of variation in the 
extent of insurance for each caste.  
Difference in the level of risk sharing among castes would have significant 
implications for the welfare of individuals of that caste group. A better insured 
individual can not only enjoy stable consumption but can also take more risks, 
which could lead to higher payoffs. Thus, difference in insurance availability 
would affect the welfare of members of certain castes by not only affecting the 
consumption stability but also their risk-taking ability.  
3. Literature review 
Over the years of research focussing on income risks faced by the rural areas of 
developing countries, the risks have been identified to be consisting of a 
collective component and an idiosyncratic component. The collective 
component consists of common risks faced by the households living in the same 
region while the idiosyncratic risks are individual specific income risks (Dercon 
2002; Dercon 2005; Townsend 1994).  
This identification has enabled researchers to analyse the efficiency of the 
informal risk mitigation arrangements. For e.g.- Mace (1991) tests for the full 
consumption insurance by contending that there is full consumption insurance 
if individual consumption responds to aggregate risks but not to idiosyncratic 
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risks. The findings are mostly indecisive regarding acceptance of full insurance 
hypothesis, but there seems to be substantial insurance through informal 
measures. In this study, Mace did not try to identify the source of insurance. 
Various other studies like- Townsend (1994), Townsend (1995), De Weerdt and 
Dercon (2006), Alderman and Paxson (1992), etc. have also tried to test for the 
full insurance hypothesis. Townsend (1994) uses the International Crops 
Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) survey data for three 
villages in southern India and finds that although the hypothesis of full 
insurance is rejected, but each household’s consumption is highly correlated 
with average village consumption. According to Alderman and Paxson (1992), 
the hypothesis of full risk sharing is extreme, requiring absence of moral hazard, 
information asymmetry and enforcement costs.  
As mentioned earlier, majority of the instruments considered in the literature for 
informal insurance fall under the three categories of- diversification, 
(Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1993), which is used ex-ante i.e. before an 
individual faces risk, and two ex-post instruments of consumption smoothing 
(Coate and Ravallion 1993) and risk sharing (Fafchamps and Lund 2003; 
Rosenzweig 1988). Townsend (1994) also tries to pin down the instrument 
which contributes the most in insuring the income in the three south Indian 
villages studied. He finds that the largest contributors are credit and gifts. He 
has used a general equilibrium framework while testing for full insurance 
hypothesis since the use of various instruments and the markets concerned are 
interdependent. This study has set the benchmark of considering the pooled 
income of the community as a determinant of a household’s consumption for 
the subsequent studies on risk sharing.  
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Since my work focuses on differential in risk sharing, following section 
concentrates on the literature on risk sharing.  
Various studies on risk sharing consider different risk sharing networks which 
also depends on the social and cultural practices of the region studied. Studies 
like Townsend (1995) consider risk sharing at the level of village, Fafchamps 
and Lund (2001) contends that most risk sharing in rural Philippines takes place 
through a network of relatives and friends, Rosenzweig (1988) observed 
considerable risk sharing through family ties in village India and that these 
transfers are preferred over the use of credit markets. While, Munshi and 
Rosenzweig (2016) propose using the caste based risk sharing network for 
India. 
Townsend (1995) looks at three economies comprising of, a set of counties of 
Thailand, sampled by Thai Socio-Economic Survey (SES); three villages in 
south India, surveyed by International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-
Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) and a set of villages in Cotê d'Ivoire, sampled by 
World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Section (LSMS), to examine the 
contribution of collective and idiosyncratic risk in the total income fluctuation 
and draw conclusions about the insurability of the income risk through various 
informal instruments available for risk mitigation. The study concludes that the 
incomes do not commove a lot even for households in the same village, which 
implies that idiosyncratic risks are more common as compared to collective 
risks and risk sharing at the village level is quite effective. 
More recent studies try to build on the previous literature by analysing the 
effects of risk sharing, especially on migration. Morten (2016) contends that 
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migration acts as a measure of self-insurance and reduces the need for risk 
sharing while informal insurance reduces the need for migration. Specifically, 
if risk sharing increases, the level of migration is reduced by 21 percentage 
points. Morten finds that temporary migration is highly prevalent in rural India 
as it helps them insure during periods of economic shock without having to give 
up the safety net of risk sharing network. 
Our study draws heavily from the methodology used by Munshi and 
Rosenzweig (2016) to measure risk sharing and redistribution. They try to 
explain the low rural-urban migration rate in India despite large spatial wage 
gap using a model of trade-off between consumption smoothing and income 
gains from migration. They contend that there are well-functioning rural 
insurance networks which are based along caste. They also propose using 
relative consumption and relative income ratio as a measure of risk sharing 
within castes.  
Udry (1994) studies risk sharing through informal loans and contracts among 
people belonging to a community network. His study reports that in North-
Nigeria risk sharing operates through these state contingent contracts which are 
extremely flexible between people who know each other well. The informal 
loans are negotiable with respect to the time of payment as well as the interest 
rate. 
Few other studies use different methods like Euler equation (Deaton 1992) and 
repeated game models (Coate and Ravallion 1993) to analyse the effects and 
efficacy of risk sharing. 
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4. Data  
I use the data from India Human Development Survey- II, covering the period 
from 2011 to 2012. It is a nationally representative survey of 42,152 households 
in 1420 villages and 1042 urban neighbourhoods across 35 states and union 
territories (Telangana was not established during the period of the survey) of 
India. This survey was jointly conducted by University of Maryland and 
National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER). 
The survey questionnaire is divided into two sections- 1. Income and social 
capital questionnaire, which provides information about the household’s 
location, composition, assets, production, expenses, wages, income and sources, 
education, consumption, debt, social network, etc. and; 2. Education and health 
questionnaire, which looks at aspects such as expenditure on education, 
condition of education for children between 8-11 years of age, marriage 
practices, water, sanitation and hygiene, morbidity, fertility, natal care and 
gender relations. For my study, I examine the data available from Income and 
social capital questionnaire. 
The survey also includes the caste information for each household in the form 
of five categories which includes the four broad caste categories of 
Forward/general castes, Other Backward Castes, Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes and an additional category of Brahmins. Brahmins form the 
top-most rung of the ladder of the caste hierarchy and the Forward/general caste 
category of the survey includes all forward castes except Brahmins. I drop the 
observations for which caste is either not specified or is categorised as ‘other’. 
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For the analysis, I only examine Hindu households living in rural areas because 
caste system is predominantly a Hindu phenomenon1 and Hindus form the 
majority of Indian population. According to the 2011 Census of India, 79.80% 
of the population are Hindus and according to the 2001 Census, it was 80.5%. 
For IHDS dataset, around 81.62% of the households are Hindus.  
For regression analysis, I combine the categories of Brahmins and Forward/ 
General castes (except Brahmins) into a single category called Forward/General 
castes because the sample size of Brahmins is just 458, which is very small as 
compared to other caste categories and Brahmins form a particular caste among 
the group of Forward castes. So, it is justified to combine them with other 
forward castes.  
However, for preliminary analysis, I analyse Brahmins separately because for 
preliminary analysis, I average the income and consumption for each quintile, 
so the sample size of Brahmins does not pose a problem and also Brahmins 
provide a good comparison, being the highest group in the caste hierarchy. 
The annual per capita consumption is calculated by estimating the total 
consumption of the household, divided by the number of people in the 
household. To estimate the total consumption, monthly consumption 
expenditure on consumables like rice, wheat, sugar, oil, cereals, fuel, 
entertainment, etc. is multiplied by 12 and added to the annual expenditure on 
                                                            
1 Although, the caste system has permeated to other religions in India, sometimes due to 
conversion of lower caste Hindus into other religions who were seeking asylum from caste 
based discrimination but including that would have complicated the analysis as there would be 
very little or no risk sharing within people of same cate group but different religion. 
11 
 
consumer durables such as jewellery, furniture, repair, school/college fee, 
vacations etc.   
I drop the observations for which annual consumption per capita is either not 
specified or is non-positive as negative or zero consumption is theoretically 
inconsistent. I also drop those observations with unspecified or non-positive 
annual per capita income. Negative or zero income is mainly attributed to 
negative farm income, due to crop failure and high costs, but including that in 
regression analysis will not be appropriate, as I compare the ratio of relative 
consumption and relative income of each household as a measure of risk 
sharing2.  Including negative values of income would make the ratio negative, 
wrongly implying lower risk sharing within castes. 
As seen in Table 1, the annual per-capita consumption of households is quite 
varied, with a range of 99,457.3 INR and a standard deviation of 13,878.68 INR 
but the variation in consumption figures is much smaller as compared to the 
variation in annual per-capita income which has a range of 1,46,525 INR and a 
standard deviation of 19,908.25 INR. Minimum annual consumption is much 
higher than the minimum annual income, which suggests that there must be a 
mechanism in place to insure people against bad income period. The variation 
in income and gap between income and consumption is an under estimate, as I 
have dropped the observations with non-positive income values. I also trim the 
values of consumption and income at 1st and 99th percentiles to ensure that the 
outcome is not affected by outliers. 
                                                            
2 Rationale for this is explained in Section 5.1 Risk sharing across castes. 
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I divide each of the four caste categories into 5 income quintiles. Relative 
consumption and relative income are calculated with respect to the average 
consumption and average income of the highest earning quintile of the 
respective caste.   
Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Per-capita consumption 21,543 20,396.2     13,878.68     4,659.2    104,116.5 
Per-capita income 21,543 19,690.53         19,908.25        960 147,485 
Relative consumption 21,543 0.68    0.44 0.12 4.18 
Relative income 21,543 0.40 0.39    0.014  4.03 
Rel C/Rel Y 21,543     2.99 4.04    0.11 142.05 
Household assets 21,538                      12.88 5.87 0     31 
Debt owed 20,136    41,254.64     130,569.2          0  6,000,000 
Govt. benefits 21,543                      1,405.07 3,588.87 0 126,700 
 
5. Preliminary analysis 
5.1 Risk sharing across castes 
To check for the patterns of risk sharing across different castes I compare the 
ratio of relative consumption and relative income, averaged across households 
belonging to same income quintile and caste in Table 23.  
 
 
                                                            
3 The dataset for preliminary analysis includes non-positive income values as I average the 
income across castes for each quintile and not compare the ratio of relative consumption and 
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where  ௜ܳ  represents ith Income Quintile 
The ratio being greater than one implies that there is risk sharing because if there 
is no risk sharing, then, on average, the relative consumption income ratio would 
be 1 for all income classes i.e. people would consume what they earn. If there 
is risk sharing, then lower income class would consume more than they earn i.e.  
their absolute consumption income ratio would be greater than 1 while for high 
income class it will be less than 1. So, the relative consumption income ratio of 
lower income class would be greater than 1. 
This claim is true under the assumption that there are no savings. The savings 
rate in rural India is extremely low, therefore this assumption holds (Munshi 
and Rosenzweig 2016; Breza and Chandrasekhar 2015).  
This table is a replication of Table 5 in Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016), except 
for the fact that they average relative consumption and relative income across 
castes and any caste based differentials cannot be deciphered.  
It can be seen from Table 2 that the relative consumption-income ratio is 
decreasing across quintiles for each caste. The ratio is 1 for the 5th quintile of 
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each caste since I calculate the relative consumption and relative income for 
each quintile with respect to the respective average for the 5th quintile. 
Similar decreasing pattern can be noticed in absolute consumption- income ratio 
as well, and for most of the castes, all quintiles, except the fifth, consume more 
than what they earn on average. This seems to confirm that there is risk sharing 
and consumption smoothing within the caste network. 
Comparing the ratio of relative consumption to relative income, across castes, 
for respective quintiles, risk sharing seems to be highest among Brahmins, 
followed closely by the forward castes and other backward castes. Scheduled 
castes and scheduled tribes seem to be lagging behind in risk sharing.  
However, it is worth noting that the absolute consumption income ratio is the 
highest among other backward castes. This doesn’t necessarily imply that there 
is higher risk sharing among them than Brahmins since that might be through 
other sources like loans from money lenders etc. I suspect this because even the 
higher income quintiles of OBCs have higher propensity to consume. The lower 
resource pool available to the OBCs, which can be demonstrated by comparing 
the total per-capita income available to the members of each caste 4, might cause 
lower risk sharing within lower castes. Therefore, it is better to consider the 
ratio of relative consumption and relative income instead of the absolute 
consumption income ratio. 
There is a huge difference between the average income of the highest earning 
quintile of Brahmins and OBCs (around 19,400 INR) while the difference 
between their average consumption is mere 6,257 INR (approx.). So, relative 
                                                            
4 Total per capita income is calculated by dividing the total income of each caste by the 
population of each caste. Total per capita income for each caste is summarized in Table A.1 in 
the appendix.  
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consumption-income ratio is a better measure of risk sharing than absolute 
consumption-income ratio since it normalizes the consumption-income ratio of 
each quintile with respect to the consumption-income ratio of the highest 
earning quintile. While the absolute consumption-income ratio depicts the 
propensity to consume. 
Table 2: Average relative and absolute consumption-income ratios for each 
quintile of different caste categories 












Brahmin 1 4135.354 17216.71 7.604523 4.163297  
2 10521.87 19959.83 3.464962 1.896985  
3 18077.38 23576.16 2.382166 1.30418  
4 29990.65 29711.08 1.809535 0.990678  




1 4847.836 19117.1 7.252125 3.943429 
 
2 11534.02 20534.08 3.274052 1.780305  
3 18911.98 23401.83 2.275643 1.237408  
4 30967.13 28508.97 1.693058 0.92062  
5 70186.79 38164.9 1 0.543762 
OBC 1 3572.603 15823.79 6.937091 4.429205  
2 8149.031 16420.4 3.155945 2.015013  
3 12838.88 19044.52 2.323242 1.483347  
4 20280.83 22696.76 1.75279 1.119124  
5 48014.45 30656.34 1 0.638482 
SC 1 4157.855 13560.52 5.256796 3.261423  
2 8381.106 14445.58 2.778099 1.723589  
3 12413.51 16008.19 2.078557 1.289579  
4 18421.45 18775.66 1.642802 1.019228  
5 39430.39 24463.42 1 0.62042 
ST 1 2962.373 10773.03 5.639731 3.636623  
2 6302.641 11539.96 2.839502 1.830973  
3 9666.272 13181.67 2.11481 1.363676  
4 14842.5 15461.12 1.615453 1.041679  
5 35720.83 23033.58 1 0.644822 




5.2 Channels of risk sharing 
The main channel for risk sharing in family networks has been considered to be 
through gifts and transfers but caste loans also seem to be quite prevalent, 
especially for contingency consumption such as marriage and medical expenses.  
Using the IHDS-2 dataset I have calculated the percentage of loans taken from 
different sources for various purposes by households of different castes. Since 
the data doesn’t provide with category for caste loans, I have considered loans 
taken from relatives as caste loans. Generally, people in the family networks 
belong to the same caste because of endogamous nature of caste system. So, my 
results will still be an underestimation of caste based loans as I just capture 
people belonging to the same family, ignoring other caste based networks. On 
the other hand, relatives come from the same caste as inter caste marriages in 
rural households are extremely rare.   
It can be observed from Table 35 that loans from relatives constitute a 
considerable portion of loans taken for contingencies. Loans from banks form a 
major portion of total loans for all purposes, but for purposes where it is difficult 
to acquire a formal loan, like contingencies and consumption, loans from 
relatives play a significant role. Also, the caste loans form major source of loans 
given out at zero interest rate. Table A.2 summarizes the amounts lent at zero 




                                                            
5 In Table 3, investment includes house, land, business, education, etc., operating costs 
include agriculture/equipment, contingencies include marriage, medical expenses and 





Table 3: Percentage of loans by source and purpose for each caste 
Purpose Source Brahmin Forward OBC SC ST 
Investment Employer 0.37 0.53 0.56 1.99 2.85 
 Money 
Lender 31.45 9.33 15.14 18.08 15.68 
 Friend 2.99 4.25 4.26 4.58 3.30 
 Relative 4.41 10.14 10.75 11.33 11.41 
 Bank 56.48 61.67 59.35 54.53 55.55 
 Others 4.30 14.07 9.93 9.48 11.21 
  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Operating 
Cost Employer 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.14 0.00 
 Money 
Lender 5.55 6.52 10.14 12.59 9.99 
 Friend 4.74 1.30 1.65 4.57 2.09 
 Relative 3.00 3.20 2.83 5.96 3.27 
 Bank 70.73 73.26 66.38 57.17 69.26 
 Others 15.99 15.72 18.67 19.56 15.39 
  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Contingency Employer 0.70 1.10 0.88 3.83 2.26 
 Money 
Lender 14.25 19.11 34.24 38.32 31.55 
 Friend 6.15 5.49 8.82 13.79 6.94 
 Relative 30.21 26.70 26.61 20.36 17.51 
 Bank 40.34 42.14 23.75 17.59 28.34 
 Others 8.35 5.46 5.70 6.11 13.41 
  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Consumption Employer 0.07 0.18 0.30 1.95 1.67 
 Money 
Lender 4.47 4.55 13.81 26.57 26.28 
 Friend 13.77 2.72 6.65 5.82 4.27 
 Relative 16.16 5.22 11.12 9.63 10.42 
 Bank 57.72 81.40 52.60 40.52 33.93 
 Others 7.82 5.93 15.52 15.52 23.43 




6. Empirical framework 






=  ߠ଴ +  ܨݎݓ݀௜ ∑ ߙ௝ହ௝ୀଵ ܳ௝௜  +  ܱܤܥ௜ ∑ ߚ௝ܳ௝௜ହ௝ୀଵ +  ܵܥ௜ ∑ ߛ௝ܳ௝௜ହ௝ୀଵ +
                      ܵ ௜ܶ ∑ ߜ௝ܳ௝௜ସ௝ୀଵ  + ߠଵܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜ + ߠଶܦܾ݁ݐ_ܱݓ݁݀௜ + ߠଷܫ݊ܿ_ܩ݋ݒ௜ + ߝ௜      (1) 
This specification, enables us to determine the effect of caste on risk sharing for 
each income quintile. The variables on assets and debt owed by the household 
would control for the difference in risk sharing due to reasons other than 
difference in caste.  Townsend (1994) also finds that landless households are 
less well insured, this forms the basis of my specification. 
I take the ratio of relative consumption and relative income as a measure of risk 
sharing (Munshi and Rosenzweig 2016), which is equivalent to the ratio of 
consumption income ratios. i represents household specific variables.  
Rel. C stands for relative consumption and Rel. Y is for relative income. 
Relative consumption and relative income have been taken with respect to the 
average consumption and average income of the 5th quintile respectively.  
I interact the dummy variables for caste with dummies for income quintiles to 
identify the effect of caste for different quintiles. So effectively, I have 19 
dummy variables, Scheduled Tribes from fifth quintile being the base category. 
Frwd, represents forward/general castes, OBC for other backward castes, SC 
for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes are represented by ST. 
ܳଵ, ܳଶ, ܳଷ, ܳସ ܽ݊݀ ܳହ represent the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th quintile 
respectively. To asses if there is a significant difference in the degree of risk 
sharing between households belonging to same income quintile but different 
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castes, I check if values of (αj – βj), (αj – γj), (αj – δ j), etc. are significantly 
different from zero.   
I control for income received through government programs using the variable 
ܫ݊ܿ_ܩ݋ݒ and for long term economic level of the household using the variable 
Assets, which is a scale that sums the number of possessions of a household on 
a scale of 0 to 31 which includes items like- pucca wall, pucca flooring, sewing 
machine, air conditioning, television etc. I also control for the debt owed by the 
household at the time of the survey. 
Inc_Gov (which includes pension schemes, drought/flood compensation etc.), 
controls for the risk insurance provided by the government. Assets and 
Debt_Owed affect the loan taking capacity of the household, while the 
Debt_Owed might also affect the consumption decisions of the household. 
I expect the relative consumption income ratio for higher income quintiles to be 
lower as compared to the lower income quintiles for the same caste. 
7. Results and discussion 
7.1 Regression results 
I first estimate equation (1) but the results suffer from heterogeneity, so I 
calculate robust standard errors clustering over the district to which each 
household belongs. I choose to cluster over district as the traditional caste 
system implies spatial segregation of castes and remnants of which can still be 
observed (Deliège 1995; Dupont 2004).  The results are presented in Table A.3. 
To analyse the differential effect of caste I need to compare the coefficients for 
different caste but same quintile, which would be given by the difference in 
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coefficients like α1-β1 for difference between Forward Castes and Other 
Backward Castes belonging to first quintile. 
Table 4 summarizes such differences with respect to the Forward castes for each 
quintile. I find that for the first quintile the differential effect of belonging to 
Forward Caste is positive, significant and large in magnitude. On average, the 
ratio of relative consumption to relative income will be higher by 0.775 units 
for households belonging to Forward Caste as compared to the household of 
other backward castes, when both are from first income quintile. This difference 
in ratio becomes 2.075 when the Forward Caste household is compared to the 
household of Schedule Caste and 1.808 for Scheduled Tribes. 
I infer that the situation is worse for Scheduled Castes, which includes Dalits 
and untouchables. These are the castes who face higher social stigma and hence 
the results seem to be consistent with the social structure.   
The differences are insignificant for households belonging to the second 
quintile. The differences for third, fourth and fifth quintile are negative and 
significant. For third and fourth quintile, this might be the case because higher 
castes tend to have higher income and hence they do not require caste loans or 
transfers. This can be demonstrated by the fact that the average consumption 
income ratio of upper caste households of fourth quintile is less than 1, while it 
is greater than 1 for households of lower castes. 
Comparing the values for fifth quintile, higher negative values of the difference 







Table 4: Relative effect of caste on relative consumption income ratio 




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 




Frwd-SC 2.075*** 0.162 -0.23*** -0.461*** -0.572*** 
Frwd-ST 1.808*** -0.125 -0.573*** -0.701*** -0.827*** 
  ***difference is significant at 1% level of significance 
  ** difference is significant at 5% level of significance 
7.2 Robustness checks 
To check for robustness of the results, I try to control for some other variables 
which might affect risk sharing by affecting the riskiness of households or the 
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a. Total income per capita (total_inc_pc) 
I control for the per capita income of each caste within each district. This is to 
control for the resource pool available to some extent as most of caste based 
transfers or loans take place among people living close by. The coefficient for 
this variable is very small and insignificant. Also, adding this variable doesn’t 





b. Percentage of land irrigated (perc_irr) 
I also include the percentage of land area irrigated out of the total land cultivated 
by the household. Agriculture is the main contributor to the income of most 
households in rural India and hence, agricultural risk is one of the major 
determinants of the risks faced by the rural households. For those households, 
which do not cultivate their own land, total irrigated land area affects their 
livelihood indirectly as they might be agricultural labourers or even for 
businesses in the region with poor irrigation facilities and bad monsoon might 
face losses due to decreased demand.  
So, for this variable, I have calculated the percentage of irrigated land out of 
total area cultivated for households which cultivate on their own land. For 
households which do not cultivate on their own land, I have taken average of 
the percentage of land irrigated out of the total land cultivated in the district they 
belong to. The land cultivated and part irrigated also depends on the season, i.e. 
Rabi, Kharif and Summer. I have averaged the percentage of land irrigated 
across all three seasons. 
I suspect that this might affect caste based risk sharing through the channel of 
caste loans because there is higher risk involved if there are poor irrigation 
facilities. Although, the coefficient on perc_irr is significant at 10% level of 
significance it doesn’t affect the other estimates much. So, the estimates are 
robust to the percentage of land irrigated.    
c. Migrant member in a household (Migrant) 
Migrant is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the household has a 
member living outside the village. It includes temporary as well as permanent 
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migrant members. I include this as a control variable as many other studies 
suspect a negative relationship between migration and caste based risk sharing. 
I find that migration is negatively related to risk sharing but the effect doesn’t 
seem to be significant. Also, the other estimates remain more or less unaffected 
by the addition of this variable. 
The results of estimation with added controls are summarized in Table A.4 of 
the appendix. 
8. Policy implications 
The differential effect of caste on risk sharing makes the poor from lower castes 
doubly disadvantaged and renders them more vulnerable to income shocks. As 
Morduch (1999) pointed out, the informal insurance systems are very limited 
and public policy programs can be more effective in insuring consumption. 
These public policy programs should either target improvement in credit and 
insurance availability or try to reduce the risk faced in agricultural production. 
Efforts should be made to improve formal credit availability for all, irrespective 
of caste and economic status. Issuance of Kisan Credit Cards(KCC) has been 
one of the major steps taken towards credit availability for agricultural sector. 
It also includes crop insurance to some extent, although the coverage for this 
program has often been questioned. Government can also regulate Non-Banking 
Financial Companies (NBFCs) to provide credit at lower requirements as they 
have a wider reach in remote areas as compared to banks. 
Countries like Kenya have implemented an innovative mobile money service 
which facilitates payments and money transfers using mobile phones called M-
Pesa without the need of smart phones and internet (Hughes and Lonie 2007). 
Such services facilitate more inclusive and easy money transfers, with reduced 
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transaction costs. Although, there are lessons to be learnt from the development 
of such services in Kenya. Mbiti and Weil (2011) find that most frequent users 
of M-Pesa are the urban, educated and affluent members of the society. While 
development of such services, the government should ensure that these are 
accessible to the lower sections as well, otherwise such steps could prove 
counterproductive and widen the gap in risk sharing between the members of 
higher and lower caste groups. Such easy and flexible money transfer services 
might also facilitate rural-urban migration as it will allow easy remittance. 
The government of India has launched an app called Bharat Interface for Money 
(BHIM) for mobile money transfer but it is only available for android mobile 
phone users and requires an internet connection. Also, other money transfer 
services which do not require a smart phone or internet connection, do require 
the customer to have a bank account, which restricts the accessibility of such 
services. These services also need to be promoted more widely and illiterate and 
semi-literate people need to be taught how to use it.  
There is a need for improvement in irrigation facilities to reduce agricultural 
risks since India’s agricultural output varies enormously with the amount of 
rainfall experienced. Irregularities in monsoon makes households more 
vulnerable and dependent on informal sources of credit and transfers. This 
makes individuals more tightly bound by the restrictions of caste.  
Index insurance is another innovative technique to insure households which face 
climate risk. Under such arrangement, insurance is paid out based on the index 
decided upon, for e.g. amount of rainfall experienced over an agreed period. 
This reduces the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard substantially 
making insurance more viable. Although, such contracts and products should 
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be designed carefully as there should be strong correlation between the index 
used and actual loss suffered (for details, see Barnett, Barrett, and Skees, 2008 
and Hellmuth et al., 2009) 
Another way to reduce farm risks is to promote diversification. More 
employment opportunities should be generated in non-agricultural sector in 
rural areas. Diversification would reduce the income and consumption risks 
faced by the households (Barrett, Reardon, and Webb 2001; Dercon 2002). 
Government can launch training programs and incentives to make individuals 
employable outside agriculture.  
Though there have been efforts by the government to promote vocational 
training through various programs and by setting up vocational training 
institutes, but the employment rate of vocationally trained individuals in India 
has been low (Agrawal 2012). Training should be more quality oriented and 
relevance of the job training should be taken care of. There is a need for job 
creation for these trained individuals within their villages as low rate of rural-
urban migration in India has been observed (Munshi and Rosenzweig 2016).  
There is also a need for better social security system to insure poor against 
consumption risks. Workfare programs like Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) have been implemented, which 
promises 100 days of employment, otherwise they are provided with 
unemployment allowance. Such schemes can prove to be quite effective if 
implemented properly. A lot still needs to be done regarding the beneficiaries 




Most of the literature on risk sharing focuses on testing the efficiency and effects 
of risk sharing. This study tries to test the possibility of lower risk sharing 
among disadvantaged communities which are the backward castes in the context 
of Indian villages. 
I find that backward castes have lower income, hence smaller resource pool, as 
well as lower proportion of risk sharing from the available resource pool. I start 
with analysing the consumption and income behaviour of households belonging 
to different income quintiles which hints towards risk sharing since households 
from low income quintiles tend to consume more than they earn, while those 
from higher quintiles consume less than what they earn. I also analyse the 
sources and purpose of loans taken by households from different caste groups. 
Caste based loans form a major source of contingency credit, which shows that 
caste based risk sharing operates not only through gifts and transfers but also 
through caste loans. 
For the empirical analysis, I find that there is indeed a differential effect of caste 
on risk sharing and the network’s tendency to facilitate consumption for 
households facing a bad income shock is constrained by the caste it belongs to. 
I find that the relative consumption income ratio for a household belonging to 
the lowest income quintile will be lowered by 0.775 units if it is an OBC 
household as compared to the upper caste household. This differential increases 
to 2.075 if a SC (which includes Dalits and untouchables) household is 
compared with an upper caste household. 
Therefore, there is an urgent need for the government to improve access to credit 
markets or to introduce better methods of risk mitigation. Also, for other studies, 
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there is a need to take into account these differential effects faced by the 
disadvantaged communities while analysing the effects of informal insurance 
systems.  
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Source Amount (INR) 
Employer 1,632,000 







Table A.3: Regression results (clustered over district) 










Caste Quintile     
      
Frwd Q1 7.003*** 6.986*** 7.036*** 7.036*** 
  (0.197) (0.195) (0.207) (0.207) 
Frwd Q2 2.204*** 2.065*** 2.078*** 2.078*** 
  (0.197) (0.195) (0.206) (0.206) 
Frwd Q3 1.158*** 0.822*** 0.847*** 0.848*** 
  (0.197) (0.196) (0.207) (0.207) 
Frwd Q4 0.606*** 0.0686 0.0729 0.0730 
  (0.197) (0.197) (0.208) (0.208) 
Frwd Q5 -0.0634 -0.843*** -0.828*** -0.827*** 
  (0.197) (0.198) (0.210) (0.210) 
OBC Q1 6.013*** 6.237*** 6.260*** 6.261*** 
  (0.180) (0.178) (0.189) (0.189) 
OBC Q2 1.992*** 2.114*** 2.104*** 2.105*** 
  (0.180) (0.178) (0.188) (0.188) 
OBC Q3 1.181*** 1.191*** 1.204*** 1.205*** 
  (0.180) (0.178) (0.188) (0.188) 
OBC Q4 0.624*** 0.459*** 0.461** 0.462** 
  (0.180) (0.178) (0.189) (0.189) 
OBC Q5 -0.0281 -0.530*** -0.573*** -0.572*** 
 
 
(0.180) (0.179) (0.191) (0.191) 
SC Q1 4.554*** 4.931*** 4.960*** 4.961*** 
  (0.191) (0.189) (0.201) (0.201) 
SC Q2 1.643*** 1.881*** 1.915*** 1.916*** 
  (0.191) (0.189) (0.200) (0.200) 
SC Q3 0.936*** 1.047*** 1.076*** 1.078*** 
  (0.191) (0.189) (0.199) (0.200) 
SC Q4 0.507*** 0.494*** 0.532*** 0.534*** 
  (0.191) (0.189) (0.200) (0.200) 
SC Q5 -0.0461 -0.278 -0.257 -0.255 
  (0.191) (0.189) (0.200) (0.201) 
ST Q1 4.643*** 5.175*** 5.227*** 5.228*** 
  (0.226) (0.225) (0.237) (0.237) 
ST Q2 1.696*** 2.179*** 2.202*** 2.203*** 
  (0.227) (0.225) (0.238) (0.238) 
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ST Q3 1.018*** 1.392*** 1.420*** 1.421*** 
  (0.226) (0.225) (0.238) (0.238) 
ST Q4 0.489** 0.751*** 0.773*** 0.774*** 
  (0.226) (0.224) (0.236) (0.236) 
Assets   0.101*** 0.0955*** 0.0955*** 
   (0.00471) (0.00497) (0.00497) 
Debt_Owed    1.75e-06*** 1.75e-06*** 
    (1.90e-07) (1.90e-07) 
Inc_Gov     -2.36e-06 
     (6.73e-06) 
Constant  1.140*** -0.121 -0.128 -0.126 
  (0.160) (0.169) (0.179) (0.179) 
      
Observation
s 
 21,543 21,538 20,131 20,131 
R-squared  0.264 0.279 0.278 0.278 
      




Table A.4: Regression results with added controls (clustered over district) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 






Caste Quintile     
      
Frwd Q1 7.036*** 7.049*** 7.001*** 6.944*** 
  (0.349) (0.365) (0.366) (0.372) 
Frwd Q2 2.078*** 2.092*** 2.046*** 2.048*** 
  (0.0958) (0.140) (0.135) (0.137) 
Frwd Q3 0.848*** 0.862*** 0.805*** 0.804*** 
  (0.0663) (0.118) (0.121) (0.121) 
Frwd Q4 0.0730 0.0879 0.0308 0.0348 
  (0.0774) (0.134) (0.135) (0.130) 
Frwd Q5 -0.827*** -0.812*** -0.880*** -0.886*** 
  (0.105) (0.137) (0.137) (0.129) 
OBC Q1 6.261*** 6.264*** 6.234*** 6.198*** 
  (0.241) (0.244) (0.244) (0.220) 
OBC Q2 2.105*** 2.108*** 2.078*** 2.074*** 
  (0.0753) (0.0794) (0.0782) (0.0800) 
OBC Q3 1.205*** 1.209*** 1.176*** 1.178*** 
  (0.0665) (0.0728) (0.0691) (0.0717) 
OBC Q4 0.462*** 0.467*** 0.433*** 0.434*** 
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  (0.0516) (0.0573) (0.0548) (0.0538) 
OBC Q5 -0.572*** -0.567*** -0.615*** -0.618*** 
  (0.0868) (0.0911) (0.0889) (0.0872) 
SC Q1 4.961*** 4.961*** 4.931*** 4.916*** 
  (0.183) (0.183) (0.180) (0.183) 
SC Q2 1.916*** 1.918*** 1.890*** 1.887*** 
  (0.0856) (0.0849) (0.0851) (0.0851) 
SC Q3 1.078*** 1.080*** 1.059*** 1.064*** 
  (0.0577) (0.0566) (0.0541) (0.0575) 
SC Q4 0.534*** 0.536*** 0.520*** 0.521*** 
  (0.0496) (0.0492) (0.0457) (0.0483) 
SC Q5 -0.255*** -0.253*** -0.276*** -0.275*** 
  (0.0508) (0.0491) (0.0500) (0.0502) 
ST Q1 5.228*** 5.225*** 5.244*** 5.231*** 
  (0.319) (0.320) (0.318) (0.321) 
ST Q2 2.203*** 2.201*** 2.207*** 2.213*** 
  (0.115) (0.119) (0.116) (0.120) 
ST Q3 1.421*** 1.420*** 1.430*** 1.445*** 
  (0.0959) (0.0967) (0.0980) (0.0997) 
ST Q4 0.774*** 0.773*** 0.773*** 0.780*** 
  (0.0746) (0.0752) (0.0763) (0.0787) 
ASSETS  0.0955*** 0.0957*** 0.0957*** 0.0956*** 
  (0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) 




  (4.87e-07) (4.86e-07) (4.78e-07) (4.99e-07) 
inc_gov  -2.36e-06 -2.35e-06 -2.35e-06 -3.86e-06 
  (6.10e-06) (6.11e-06) (6.14e-06) (5.60e-06) 
total_inc_pc   -1.22e-06 1.11e-06 1.30e-06 
   (9.34e-06) (9.17e-06) (9.30e-06) 
perc_irr    0.262* 0.240* 
    (0.138) (0.141) 
Migrant     -0.0248 
     (0.108) 
Constant  -0.126 -0.109 -0.207 -0.199 
  (0.125) (0.173) (0.181) (0.175) 
      
Observations  20,131 20,131 20,131 19,808 
R-squared  0.278 0.278 0.278 0.281 
      
      
 
 
